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Abstract—Effective performance in a situation relies on having a 
good awareness of that situation or at least, if SA is poor, being aware 
that this is the case.  This study examined the bias (tendency to accept 
or reject available information) and actual and perceived SA of 
firefighters across two different situations The data suggested that, 
although actual SA and bia varied across the situations, perceived SA 
remained relatively constant.  This raises the possibility that 
individuals may have a ‘resting level’ of perceived SA and that the 
tasks used in this study were effective in manipulating actual SA while 
perceived SA remained at the resting level. 
 
Keywords—Actual SA, firefighting, perceived SA, situation 
awareness. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
T 12:30 on July 6th, 1994, three local firefighting crews 
and jumpers (wildfire fighters who parachuted into the 
fire zone) spread out to combat a fire in the South Canyon of 
Storm King Mountain, Colorado. At 16:06 a radio message of, 
‘Everyone out of the canyon’ went out, and 18 firefighters 
were running for their lives.  At 16:13, only six had outpaced 
the fire and reached safety.  The other 12, including the team 
leader, died on the side of the mountain.  As well as these 12, 
two other firefighters died on the mountain in different 
circumstances, bringing the final death toll to 14.  An analysis 
of the incident [1] suggests that some of the decisions made by 
the team leader were ‘suboptimal’.   
In particular, the de facto incident commander failed to 
obtain a weather report that would have warned of a change in 
the weather that was to lead to the ‘blowover’ that overtook, 
and killed, the firefighters.   
Failing to obtain the weather report suggests that the 
situation awareness (SA) of the incident commander was 
incomplete.  Even worse, he appeared to be unaware that this 
was so.  He could have requested the weather report at any 
time, but did not do so.  As is apparent from the outcome, this 
is one of the most dangerous situations; an individual that has 
poor SA but does not know it [e.g. 2].  The Storm King 
Mountain fire graphically illustrates a number of important 
aspects of SA that are crucial in potentially hazardous 
situations such as firefighting.  These are: 
How SA is built.  It is often the case that large amounts of 
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information are potentially available. Building good SA 
requires the selection of appropriate information.  The incident 
commander could have obtained the weather report.  He did 
not.  The tendency to either accept or reject available 
information when building SA will be referred to in this paper 
as ‘bias’. 
How good the achieved SA is.  Failure to obtain the weather 
report resulted in a poor level of SA. The weather was likely 
to change, but the incident commander was not aware of this 
possibility until it was too late. 
How aware an individual is of their own SA.  Poor SA is a 
relatively less serious problem if the individual is aware that 
their SA is poor.  Knowing that their SA is poor, they may 
compensate, for example, by opting for safer options when 
making decisions.  It is far more serious if the individual has 
poor SA but does not know it.  This was the situation on 
Storm King Mountain.  A change in the weather was about to 
make the firefighters’ situation untenable. The incident 
commander was not aware of the weather forecast – his SA 
was poor. If he had been aware of this gap in his SA, he could 
have rectified it by requesting a weather report.  He did not. 
The research presented in this paper used a technique that 
has been developed to assess all three of the aspects of SA 
described above. The technique was used to investigate the 
relationships between the three aspects of SA and to compare 
them within, and across, two different scenarios. 
II.  METHODS 
A. Design 
The experiment was a within-participants design measuring 
actual and perceived SA, and bias, across two simulated 
fireground scenarios. 
B. Participants 
Participants were 20 serving UK firefighters aged from 19-
53 years (Mean=38 years, SD = 9 years). 
C. Materials and Apparatus 
Two different firegrounds (one in a house, one in a factory) 
were mocked-up using a series of videos and photographs.  
Each scenario involved a video of a ‘drive to’ to the scene, 
followed by videos giving information from bystanders.  A 
series of slides were then presented ‘stepping through’ the 
fireground from the entrance to the house/factory. 
SA was assessed using QASA (Quantitative Analysis of 
Situation Awareness) [3, 4], a technique that has been 
successfully used to measure SA in similar situations [5].  In 
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this case, QASA was used to give three measures: a measure 
of actual SA (as compared to the ‘ground truth’); a measure of 
the extent to which individuals were likely to accept or reject 
available information (referred to as ‘bias’); a rating of how 
confident individuals’ were that each answer they gave was 
correct (a measure of their perceived SA). 
D. Procedure 
All participants gave informed consent.  Each participant, as 
part of a group, viewed the scenarios projected onto a screen.  
At intervals the scenario was stopped and a series of true/false 
statements (half were actually false and half were true) 
concerning the scenario were presented.  For each statement, 
participants were asked to indicate whether they believed the 
statement to be true or false, and were also asked to rate (on a 
scale of 1 (guess) to 4 (certain) how confident they were that 
the answer they had just given was correct.  Participants were 
given no feedback during the experiment as to whether their 
responses were correct or not, although they were informed 
post hoc as to what the correct answers were. 
III. RESULTS 
The SA scores were calculated using QASA, that uses 
signal detection theory [6] to give a measure of the ability to 
tell true from false statements and also gives a measure of 
bias.  Confidence ratings were averaged to give a single score 
for each participant in each scenario. 
Using a Bonferroni-corrected alpha value of 0.0035, no 
significant correlation was found between SA and confidence 
in either the factory (r = 0.081, N = 20, p = 0.734) or the house 
(r = -0.246, N = 20, p = 0.297) scenarios.  There was also no 
significant correlation between participants’ SA scores (r = 
0.053, N = 20, p = 0.824), or bias scores (r = 0.132, N = 20, p 
= 0.58),  across the house and the factory scenarios.  There 
was, however, a significant correlation between the 
participants’ confidence scores in the house and factory 
scenarios (r = 0.629, N = 20, p = 0.003). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The results indicated that the bias and SA measures 
obtained in each of the scenarios showed no significant 
correlation.  That is, a firefighter that showed high bias or SA 
on one scenario might show high or low on the other.    
Individuals’ levels of bias and SA apparently varied according 
to the situation.  There was no significant correlation between 
perceived and actual SA in either scenario.  In fact, such 
correlation as there was, was negative.  Thus, the firefighters 
tested appeared to be unaware of their own level of SA. 
Perhaps the most important result was that there was a 
highly significant correlation between perceived SA scores 
across the two scenarios (r = 0.629, n = 20, p = 0.003).  That 
is, individuals maintained their level of confidence (high or 
low) in their own SA across the two situations, independently 
of their actual SA. 
The data suggest that firefighters maintained a level of 
confidence in their own SA that was consistent across 
situations, but unrelated to their actual SA.  Undoubtedly, this 
would mean that some of the firefighters believed their SA to 
be good when it was, in fact, poor.  Whether such a consistent 
level of perceived SA would be found in ‘real’ situations is 
open to debate. The scenarios, although representing aspects 
of a fireground, could never hope to replicate the stress and 
pressure of a real incident.  Also, the essentially non-
interactive nature of the tasks in this study may have meant 
that individual’s did not receive enough feedback to change 
their level of perceived SA.  This study does, however, 
suggest that perhaps individuals have a ‘resting’ level of 
perceived SA that they will maintain until something (such as 
feedback from the situation) drives a change in perceived SA. 
If individuals do have a ‘resting’ level of perceived SA, it 
would be interesting to determine what factors cause changes 
in such a resting might level of perceived SA.  In particular, it 
would be valuable to know whether the actual SA, in any 
particular situation, is influenced by the resting perceived SA. 
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